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The Impact of the Crisis on the Real Economy 
Daniel Gros and Cinzia Alcidi 
 
Background 
The recent financial crisis came about because a bubble burst. Keeping this in mind leads us to important 
considerations: 
1)  Europe, and in particular the euro area, exhibited the same pre-crisis or ‘bubble symptoms’ (house 
price increase, excess credit growth) as the US. 
2)  The impact of the crisis on the real economy should be assessed taking into account the fact that 
part of the pre-crisis growth was based on ‘froth’ and therefore not sustainable. 
3)  If one looks at the crisis as the inevitable adjustment after a bubble, one should compare the present 
state of the economy against some ‘normal’ state (in the absence of a bubble) and not just to 2007, 
which represents the peak of the bubble (and therefore an unsustainable situation). Accounting for 
this leads to a quite different picture of the severity of the crisis. 
4)  Fundamentally, one should assess the damage of the crisis in terms of changes in unemployment 
and consumption (rather than only in GDP). A ‘happiness’ indicator, based on these two variables, 
has behaved in quite different ways across member countries. 
5)  Perspectives for the recovery? It does not seem that a credit crunch will impede a recovery as 
reflected in the ECB survey of bank loan officers indicating a return to normal, pre-crisis (but also 
pre-bubble) levels. Credit growth is still negative, but a more meaningful measure of the credit 
market is the ‘credit impulse’, (i.e. the first change in the flow of credit) which has improved 
sharply over the last year and seems to have returned to ‘normal’ by the end of 2009.  
 
1. Introduction 
This crisis was caused by a combination of asset price 
bubbles, mainly in the real estate sector, and a credit 
bubble that led to excessive leverage. This is well-
known. What is less well-known is that on both accounts 
the euro area was affected by both ‘bubble’ symptoms as 
much as the US.  
This fact can be illustrated by looking at indicators of 
house prices and leverage. 
1.1 House  prices 
As shown in Figure 1, the price-to-rent ratio increased 
since 1997 as much in the euro area as in the US. The 
increase was even larger in the UK. The increase in 
house prices measured by some overall European 
average was thus somewhat higher than in the US.
1 On 
this account one can thus say that Europe experienced 
a real estate bubble as least as bad as that of the US. 
                                                      
1 Unfortunately there is no reliable data on house prices in most 
of the new member countries. 
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Figure 1. Bubble symptom one: house prices 
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Note: Euro area index is defined as the weighted average (by GDP) of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, 
Ireland and the Netherlands.  
Source: OECD, December 2009, and own computations. 
 
1.2 Leverage 
For a company leverage indicates the ratio between debt 
and equity. For a country leverage is better defined as 
the ratio of credit outstanding to GDP (which is a 
measure of the equity of a country).  
Table 2 below shows some basic indicators of leverage 
defined in this way (see also Alcidi & Gros, 2009). The 
table tells a simple story: in the euro area (EA), the 
increase in overall leverage, measured by the (private) 
debt-to-GDP ratio, was actually somewhat higher than 
the one experienced in the US; only its distribution over 
different sectors was different.  
Table 1. Bubble symptom tow: excess leverage 
Debt-to-GDP ratio  Economy-wide  Non-financial 
corporate sector
   EA  US  EA  US 
1999  3.45 2.66 0.67 0.46
2007  4.46 3.47 0.92 0.49
2009q2  4.88 3.59 1.01 0.51
Change 1999-2007  1.01  0.81  0.25  0.03
 
Debt-to-GDP ratio  Financial sector  Households 
& small business
  EA US EA US 
1999  1.55 0.79 0.48 0.88
2007  2.25 1.17 0.61 1.28
2009 q2  2.41 1.16 0.64 1.25
Change 1999-2007  0.70   0.38  0.13  0.40
 
Note: For the euro area the debt is computed as the sum of securities 
and loans, except for Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs as 
defined by the ECB) where debt is given by debt securities issued 
plus deposits (intra-MFIs loans are not included). The financial 
sector in the EA is defined as MFIs, insurance corporations and 
pension funds and other financial intermediaries including financial 
auxiliaries. 
Economy-wide sector includes households, non-financial companies, 
financial sector and government both in US and EA.  
Sources: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, Euro Area Accounts 
(closing balance sheet liabilities) & Federal Reserve Z1, December 
2009. 
 
Moreover, the latest available data suggest that there has 
been no progress so far on de-leveraging. The small 
reductions in debt achieved in the private sector have 
been more than compensated by the fall in GDP. 
1.3  An ‘Anglo-Saxon bubble’? 
Overall one must thus conclude that the bubble was not 
mainly a US phenomenon. The fact that both sides of 
the Atlantic showed the same bubble symptoms already 
suggests that the crisis should not have been expected to 
remain a US phenomenon.  
The crisis became truly global, because of two main 
transmission mechanisms: the sudden rise in risk 
aversion (and financial market volatility) was 
transmitted worldwide as financial markets are highly 
integrated at the global level. Moreover, the sudden 
drop in demand, especially for capital intensive goods, 
was transmitted rapidly along the global supply chain. 
Within Europe the integration of financial markets and 
supply chains is even stronger than at a global level, as a The Impact of the Crisis on the Real Economy | 3 
consequence the crisis affected all member countries, 
even those that had not shown any bubble symptoms 
(i.e. had had stable house prices and no increase in 
leverage). It is thus not surprising that all member 
countries were affected by the crisis, even those without 
a bubble (e.g. Germany, where house prices and 
leverage did not increase).  
2.  How to measure the impact of the 
crisis on the real economy 
2.1  The impact of the crisis on output 
We start by briefly discussing the impact of the crisis on 
growth (GDP). The first crucial point to emphasise is 
that since the crisis emerges from the bursting of a 
bubble, an assessment of it requires setting the excess 
growth during the bubble against the loss of output 
during the crisis. Figure 2 shows an attempt to measure 
the impact of the entire boom-bust cycle on the real 
economy. The dark solid line shows the level of real 
GDP as currently projected by the IMF (projections 
available until 2014) whereas the dashed line shows the 
expected levels based on average growth rates of the 
pre-crisis years. The dashed line thus shows what might 
have been expected close to the peak of the bubble 
when it was not widely recognised as such. Yet the 
central question is: what would have been the path for 
output if there had been no bubble (and no crisis)?  
This requires an estimate of the potential growth of the 
European economy without the bubble. We estimated 
this in the following way: the latest data from the 
European Commission (issued at the end of 2009) show 
that in 2007 the output gap was at 2.5% (one year ago 
the Commission thought that the output gap had been 
close to zero during 2007). If we assume that this is the 
effect of a bubble, we can conclude that the bubble has 
increased the observed growth rate by 0.5% a year, 
between 2004 and 2008. Hence the ‘no-bubble’ GDP 
level, plausibly, should have followed the light solid 
line in the chart. Without a bubble, the level of real 
GDP would have been below actual rates between 2004 
and 2008; but from 2009 onwards well above. The chart 
also illustrates that, at least according to the current IMF 
projections for 2014, the European economy has not yet 
returned to the likely no-bubble path of GDP, 
suggesting a considerable over shooting: the crisis 
caused additional losses in output.  
 
Figure 2. Long-tem effect of the crisis on GDP in the Euro area 
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Source: World Economic Outlook (IMF), October 2009, and own calculations. 
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Table 2 provides two alternative estimates of the cost of 
the crisis in terms of GDP. The first column reports the 
difference between the level of real GDP predicted by the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) as of October 
2009 and the expected level of GDP at the peak of the 
bubble, assuming that it goes on forever, whereas the 
second column shows the percentage difference between 
the estimated levels of output expected for 2014 in the 
absence of a bubble (and without a bust later) and as if 
the bubble would have lasted. This latter, by using an 
estimation of the ‘normal’ path of the economy as a 
benchmark, is likely to be a better indicator of the cost in 
terms of lost output from the crisis. This column suggests 
that the cost of the bubble bust is quite similar across the 
Atlantic, though larger in the US, and that within Europe 
the euro area has suffered somewhat less than the UK 
and the new member countries. By contrast the first 
column suggests that the cost of the crisis (if compared to 
‘bubble expectations’) is much higher in the EU. 
Table 2. Long term implications of the crisis 
Percentage difference between:   
Current projections 
and bubble 
expectations for 2014 
No-bubble path and 
bubble expectations 
for 2014) 
EU   -9.6 -5.5 
Euro Area  -8.4 -5.4 
US  -6.3 -6.5 
Note: No-bubble path is based on the assumption that the ‘excess 
growth’ driven by the bubble is 0.5% each year over the period 2004-
2008 for Europe and 2003-2007 for the US. 
Source: WEO and own calculations 
2.2  The crisis and happiness 
Although the crisis went global, it is still hitting different 
countries in quite different ways. It has become a popular 
pastime to rank countries by the fall they experience in 
GDP and then pass judgement accordingly on their 
‘economic model’. But even apart from the argument 
above one has to ask the question: is the fall in GDP the 
appropriate measure for a cross-country comparison of 
the real world impact of the crisis, particularly for this 
crisis? GDP refers to the amount of goods and services 
produced in a given economy. However, the GDP 
statistics have little real meaning for the wider public 
whose lives are affected much more by the amount of 
money that can be spent in consumption and by job 
stability. What happens to consumption and employment 
should represent a better indicator of the impact of the 
crisis than changes in GDP. 
These considerations apply in particular to the EU, given 
that economic policy is still determined mostly at the 
national level and a large heterogeneity of effects has 
emerged. A comparison of Germany with the US and 
Spain provides a good example of the degree of 
heterogeneity in the consequences of the crisis.  
A key factor behind cross-country heterogeneity is the 
existence of different growth models in each country. It 
is apparent that Germany’s huge current account has 
provided a cushion and allowed consumption to remain 
constant. During 2009, Germany’s GDP fell by about 
5%, but consumption remained roughly unchanged. 
The discrepancy between consumption and production 
is due to two factors: the current account surplus has 
declined by about 3 percentage points of GDP and 
investment has fallen by about 2 percentage points of 
GDP (this means a fall in investment of about 10%). 
These two factors account for the 5 percentage points 
difference between the growth rate of GDP (-5%) and 
consumption (0). 
In the US, the current account swing is in the other 
direction. As a consequence, even though US GDP 
declined by less (according to the IMF and the 
Commission by about 3-4%) than in Germany, US 
consumption had to fall. Despite an improvement of 
about 2 percentage points of GDP in 2009 in the US 
current account deficit, domestic absorption fell by 
about 5% (3% decline in production plus 2% decline in 
net resource transfer from abroad). This is a much 
more painful adjustment than in Germany. Part of this 
overall decline in domestic absorption has fallen on 
investment.
2 Yet since consumption accounts for 
roughly 70% of GDP, consumption had to fall 
significantly as well. In the US consumption had been 
increasing trend-wise by about 2.5 to 3% in recent 
years. US consumers will thus have to accept a swing 
in the growth rate of consumption from plus 3% to 
minus 1-2 %; a change of over 4 percentage points. By 
contrast, in Germany consumption had in any event 
been stagnant since about 2001 with little change 
brought about by the crisis. 
The wide difference in terms of the current account in 
the starting positions of Germany (+6% of GDP) and 
the US (-6% of GDP) implies that in Germany stable 
consumption is sustainable in the longer run even in 
the case that GDP does not recover,
3 while in the US 
consumption has to fall even if there is to be a 
sustained recovery.  
But why do German consumers continue to spend? The 
best answer is: why not? German consumers did not 
rely on credit or on inflated house prices to finance 
their expenditure. By contrast consumers in the US (or 
Spain) had little choice but to spend less when the 
value of their houses tumbled and access to credit 
became more difficult.  
                                                      
2 In 2009, US investment fell by more than 15% (year-on-year 
change). 
3 Many commentators have recently argued that Germany 
should rethink its export-led growth model because this model 
did not prevent a fall in its GDP, which was even larger than the 
US or France, for example. However, is this model so bad if it 
allows Germany to carry on consuming in the midst of the most 
severe recession in 70 years while consumers elsewhere have to 
tighten their belts considerably? The Impact of the Crisis on the Real Economy | 5 
Figure 3. Standardised ‘happiness index’: the US and Europe 
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Sources: Data for growth in consumption extracted from Eurostat, December 2009 and for rates of unemployment, from AMECO (database of 
DG Ecofin, European Commission), December 2009.  
Another reason why German consumption remains stable 
is the performance of the labour market: employment has 
not fallen noticeably so far in Germany.  
This leads to the second indicator of how much the crisis 
really hurts: the unemployment rate. Here again there are 
wide differences across countries. In Germany 
unemployment has so far increased only marginally (by 
0.3%, from 7.2% in October 2007 to 7.5 in October 
2009), compared to an increase of 4.4 percentage points 
over the same time period in the US (from 5.8% to 10.2 
%) or over 8 percentage points in Spain (from 11.4% to 
19.3%). 
What is the reason for these differences? German 
enterprises have invested strongly in the skills of their 
labour force and therefore hold on to their skilled 
workers even if some of them are temporarily not 
needed. Generous provisions for the financing of 
temporary part-time work also help to stabilise 
employment. But other European countries have similar 
labour market rules. The key difference here is that in 
Spain most of the increase in employment over the last 
decade was in low-skilled workers in the construction 
and tourism industries. Since these sectors are 
contracting, Spanish enterprises see no reason to retain 
these workers, which do not possess the highly 
specialised skills necessary for globally competitive 
manufacturing. Moreover, these workers were usually 
hired on the flexible fringe of the Spanish labour market, 
using temporary or other atypical contracts. 
Putting consumption and unemployment together in one 
index, one obtains a quite different picture from the one 
revealed by just looking at GDP. Figure 3 shows a 
transatlantic comparison of the ‘happiness index’. This is 
simply the combination of the growth rate of real 
consumption and the increase in the unemployment rate 
with negative sign. In order to make these two series 
comparable they have first been ‘standardised’
4 so that 
a value of minus four means that the index has fallen 
four standard deviations below its average – which 
should be an extremely rare occurrence.  
Standardising the variables this way has the advantage 
that it takes into account the expectations of what 
constitutes a ‘normal’ or acceptable economic 
performance, which is usually based on actual data 
over recent years. The ‘misery’ index based on 
standardised variables thus represents the element of 
surprise in the combination of negative growth and 
unemployment experienced by the economies under 
consideration. 
On this account, Europe does only slightly better than 
the US. The difference is small because unemployment 
is usually much more stable in Europe. Although 
unemployment had increased much less in the euro 
area than in the US, this translates into a similar 
deterioration because with the lower variance in 
Europe, such an event is equally exceptional. 
As already discussed above, the euro area data average 
out both bubble-led (e.g. Spain) and export-led 
economies, such as Germany. As shown in Figure 4, 
strong differences exist within the euro area, with a 
clear hierarchy: Germany is better off than all the 
others, with little deterioration in its index while Spain 
is at the other extreme. Its value of –3.6 implies that 
the current combination of consumption growth and 
unemployment is 3.6 standard deviations below the 
average – which should be an extremely rare event if 
disturbances are normally distributed. Italy and France 
are between these two extremes. 
                                                      
4 In the usual way, that is by subtracting the mean and dividing 
by the standard deviation. Mean and standard deviation are 
computed using observed data over the period 2004-2009. 6 | Gros & Alcidi 
Figure 4. Standardised ‘happiness index’ for major EU countries 
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Sources: Idem. 
3.  Boom and bust: What goes up must 
come down 
The previous section argued that a combination of 
consumption growth and (un)employment is a better 
indicator than GDP in measuring the impact of the crisis 
on the real economy. However, it may be misleading to 
look at changes in these variables only since the 
outbreak of the crisis, the reason being that those years 
do not constitute an appropriate benchmark.  
This is obviously true for the availability of credit. By 
common consent, credit was excessively available 
during the boom in many countries on the periphery of 
Europe. Consumption and investment were largely 
financed by capital flows which, with hindsight, were 
only forthcoming because risk aversion (and risk 
recognition) was distorted by the credit boom. 
Evidence of this is provided by the consumption paths. 
Across member countries there is strong negative 
correlation between the change in consumption over the 
period 2009-10 and the last two years before the bubble 
burst: consumption is now falling most in those 
countries where it had increased most during the boom. 
The Baltic States represent the most extreme case: 
consumption increased at double digit rates until 2007 
and is now also falling at double digit rates. By contrast 
consumption is essentially stable in Germany, where it 
did not increase noticeably even during the bubble 
years. 
Figure 5 plots the data for all EU-member countries. 
The horizontal axis shows the average annual increase 
in consumption in 2005-2007 (the peak of the bubble), 
and the vertical axis shows the corresponding values 
now that the bubble has burst (2009 actual data and 
forecasts for 2010 by the European Commission). 
Figure 5. Financial crisis: consumption during boom and bust in EU countries 
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The present crisis is clearly different from the aftermath 
of the dot-com bubble since the correlation between pre- 
and post-bubble (i.e. during the downturn of 2001-02) 
growth of consumption is positive. Figure 6 shows, by 
comparison, the same data (average annual growth of 
consumption) for the dot-com boom and bust years. Not 
only is the correlation positive, there is also much lower 
cross-country variability during the dot-com episode than 
now. 
As shown in Table 3 data on imports and investment (in 
equipment) confirm the trend shown by consumption but 
with deeper swings before and after the crisis. Across EU 
countries, correlation in imports growth rates pre- and 
post- financial crisis is highly negative and much larger 
than what was observed at the time of the dot-com 
bubble, though negative in both cases. In the case of 
investment growth rates, despite the large positive 
average before the crisis and the negative one in the 
years following the bust, correlation is very weak (close 
to zero) and lower than what was observed at the time of 
the dot-com bubble. Data simply suggest a generalised 
fall in investment across all countries during the bust 
period with all growth rates indistinctly negative and a 
fall after the bust far larger (in absolute terms) than the 
increase during the boom. Such behaviour cannot be 
ascribed to sector-specific effects or adjustments to 
overinvestment in the previous period (as is likely to be 
the case in the construction sector), but rather the 
consequence of global factors, namely the dramatic 
increase in risk aversion and the dire outlook for the 
whole economy as a result of the financial crisis. 
There is thus clear evidence that in many respects this 
crisis represented a return to more stable, ‘normal’ 
conditions. It is always difficult to measure what rate 
of growth of consumption (and GDP) would be 
sustainable. However, there is one variable that gives 
some information about the extent to which the 
economy is operating at a ‘normal’ level of activity. 
This is the output gap. Of course, there are many 
different measures of the output gap. We use here the 
most recent data from the Commission (ECFIN). The 
data in this respect (shown in Figure 7) portray a 
similar pattern as for consumption: the countries with 
the strongest boom (highest output gap) also have (and 
are expected to have) the strongest fall (highest 
negative output gap). 
 
Figure 6. Dot-com crisis: consumption during boom and bust in EU countries 
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Table 3.Financial crisis: imports and investment in equipment during boom and bust 
  Imports  Investment in equipment 
  Boom: 2005-2008  Bust: 2009-2011  Boom: 2005-2008  Bust: 2009-2011 
EU  7.0 -6.1  6.4  -10.8 
Euro area  6.6 -5.7  6.2  -9.7 
Note: EU is average of EU27 for imports and of EU15 for investment. 
Euro area is EA16 in the case of imports and EA12 in the case of investment. 
Sources: AMECO and own computations. 8 | Gros & Alcidi 
Figure 7 Cumulative output gap during the boom and the bust 
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Source: European Commission Economic Forecast, 22 October 2009, output gap relative to potential GDP 
(deviation of actual output from potential output as % of potential GDP 1992-2001). 
Of course, a crisis implies adjustment but, by itself, does 
not just lead to a return of normal conditions. As the 
boom supported ‘above normal’ levels of activity for 
some time, large negative output gaps are expected to 
persist for a while. Table 4 shows the cumulative output 
gain during the boom represented by the sum of the 
output gap during the last three boom years (2005-2008) 
compared to the loss of output (relative to normal) for 
the first three years of the bust, while Table 5 reports 
similar (end of period rather than cumulative) data for 
unemployment.  
Table 4. Cumulated output gap by country groups 
 
Boom: 
2005-2008 
Bust: 
2009-2011 
Boom 
plus bust 
Old Members  6.2 -9.6  -3.4 
New Members  20.7 -13.0 7.6 
EU  6.5 -9.0  -2.5 
Euro area  5.6 -8.4  -2.8 
Sources: Own computations based on EC Economic Forecast. 
The key message of this table is that in terms of the 
output gap the new members are still in positive 
territory (overall they benefitted from the ‘package’ 
boom and bust), whereas ‘old’ member states (and of 
course the euro area) show a ‘net loss’.  
In terms of unemployment the crisis seems destined to 
leave a net negative legacy everywhere with forecasted 
rates higher than pre-boom levels. Yet as of 2009, new 
member states, on average, still exhibit a net gain in the 
sense that their unemployment rates were still (at 10.1 
%) somewhat below the value before the boom (2004) 
when they stood at 10.4%.  
Table 5. Unemployment rate during the boom and the bust 
 
Before the 
boom 2004 
Peak 
of the 
boom 2007 
2009 
Forecast 
2011 
Old Members  7.1 6.0  8.0  9.2 
New Members  10.4 6.4  10.1  11.1 
EU  9.0 7.1  9.1  10.2 
Euro area  9.0 7.5  9.5  10.9 
Sources: AMECO and own computations. 
As far as financial market indicators are concerned, risk 
aversion increased dramatically during 2008/9. This 
explains the sharp contraction in investment and 
consumption in 2009, but with financial market 
indicators rapidly returning to average pre-crisis, or 
even better than average values, one would also expect a 
rapid recovery. However, this is not materialising. One 
reason can be summarised under the heading ‘balance 
sheet constraints’: over-indebted consumers and firms 
cannot maintain the level of their consumption and 
investment if they have not worked off their debt 
beforehand. However this can only be a partial 
explanation because the debt data by sectors (see Table 
1 above and Alcidi and Gros, 2009) suggest that, while 
firms might have problems, the household sector does 
not look over-indebted in the euro area (at least not on 
average). 
Another reason is that the credit bubble has been going 
on for so long that households (and firms) have 
accumulated an overhang of durable consumer goods 
(e.g. in some of the new member countries) and of fixed 
capital (especially housing in Spain and Ireland).
5  
                                                      
5 See Gros (2007) for estimates of the huge housing overhang in 
Spain and Ireland. The Impact of the Crisis on the Real Economy | 9 
This is a key point: in analysing the impact of the crisis 
on the real economy one must start by understanding the 
build-up of the bubble that preceded the crisis. In fact it 
might turn out to be erroneous to expect that once the 
recovery starts the global economy will go back to pre-
crisis levels. Those growth rates were to some extent 
fake and attainable again only if new bubbles are 
fuelled. 
That the bubble distorted the view of what is ‘normal’ 
can also be seen from the fact that the official estimates 
of the output gap changed considerably over the last 
year. For example, the Commission estimated as late as 
early 2008 that in the preceding year, 2007, the euro 
area had not substantially exceeded its potential level as 
it then estimated the output gap for 2007 at only 0.2% 
(= excess of actual output over potential). One year 
later, after the crisis had broken, the estimate of the 
output gap for 2007 was revised up to 2.5%. This shows 
how bubbles can distort the view of what is ‘normal’. 
The dot-com bubble had a similar effect. In early 2000 
it was thought that the euro area economy still had a lot 
of slack because the output gap was estimated at -2%; 
today this value has been revised to +1.2% (implying 
that already in 1999 there was no slack in the euro area 
economy because actual output was already above 
potential). 
As an aside, we should keep in mind that this 
overestimation of potential output was at least partially 
responsible for the over-optimistic targets set in the 
Lisbon Strategy. 
4. Credit  crunch? 
It is difficult to determine whether the recovery is being 
held back by the limited availability of credit. 
According to loan officer surveys of the ECB, banks 
have continued to tighten their credit standards, also 
over the third quarter of 2009, but at slower pace, so 
that this indicator is back to a level comparable to the 
pre-boom years, which did not impede a recovery from 
the post dot-com bust (and the 9/11 shock). See Figure 
8. 
It is apparent, however, that a rapid deterioration in 
credit availability preceded the current downturn. As 
already mentioned above, credit availability has now 
returned to the pre-bubble level, but a lead in the 
recovery similar to the post dot-com bubble-bust is not 
observable and the pick up in economic activity remains 
so far largely unsatisfactory. 
The sparse data available on the reasons given by banks 
for not granting credit do not suggest that there is a fully 
fledged credit crunch. According to the banks surveyed 
the reluctance to lend is mainly determined by the 
expectations that the adverse economic environment 
will continue for some time, and only to a lesser extent 
to supply-side constraints related to banks’ access to 
funding. 
 
 
Figure 8. Real growth and credit standards in the euro area 
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Sources: ECB Bank lending survey, 28 October 2009, variable represented (with a minus sign): net percentage 
of banks responding to the following question: over the past three months, how have your bank's credit 
standards as applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises changed? 
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Figure 9. Credit impulse and stock market volatility  
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Note: Credit impulse is defined as the second difference (ΔC t- ΔCt-1) of total loans extended, by euro area MFIs, 
to non-financial corporations and households. VIX is an index of stock market volatility traded on the CBOE.  
Source: ECB Statistical Warehouse. 
 
In principle bank lending surveys (both the ECB and 
those of the Federal Reserve) measure changes, i.e. the 
proportion, in loan officers reporting higher lending 
standards with respect to the previous quarter. In order to 
measure the level of credit availability one should thus, 
at least in theory, not consider the changes reported each 
quarter, but the cumulative change since the start of the 
series. However, in reality it turns out that the cumulative 
changes only predict continuous tightening
6 and changes 
reported each quarter constitute a better indicator. 
One reason for considering changes in credit availability 
as the more relevant predictor of future economic activity 
is that this is in reality what disrupts investment plans of 
firms (and thus affects the change in actual investment). 
In fact, lenders tend to tighten standards in a very abrupt 
fashion but ease up very smoothly. When credit 
standards are tightened loans plummet immediately and 
continue to do so at least until there is sign of easing. 
Output also usually falls shortly after bank lending terms, 
but it does not recover immediately, even if credit again 
becomes more freely available.
7 In this sense the change 
in bank lending standards is an asymmetric predictor of 
economic growth. This goes some way to explaining how 
the recovery that started in 2003/4 could take place while 
tightening was still going on. In a similar vein, the ECB, 
                                                      
6 One has to keep in mind that this is a qualitative survey, i.e. a 
collection of opinions, which are likely to be biased with the aim 
of pleasing the surveyors or conditioned by the fear that their 
input will be used for supervisory purposes. For a detailed 
investigation of the value of these surveys and their power in 
predicting both lending and output growth, see Lown et al. (2000). 
7 Similar considerations apply to the survey of the Federal 
Reserve, which is available for a longer time period; recovery 
started in 2002 while credit tightening (although at a decreasing 
rate) was still in place. 
in its last Financial Stability Report, stressed that, 
given the general economic outlook, banks still seem 
very cautious in the extension of new loans. 
The (qualitative) surveys of loan officers can only 
indicate a certain improvement in credit availability. 
However, as has been widely reported, money and 
credit growth turned negative (on an annual basis) at 
the end of 2009. Does this imply that the recovery 
cannot start (or last) because of a lack of credit? This 
should not be the case. 
The reason is simple: much economic activity (for 
example investment) requires credit. However, 
investment is a flow and should be related to the flow 
of credit (not the stock of credit outstanding). This is 
argued forcefully by Biggs et al. (2009). If one looks 
for indications from financial markets for a recovery, 
one should look at the change in the flow of credit, also 
known as the credit impulse. 
The most recent data available on the credit impulse 
suggest, as shown in Figure 9 below, that we may have 
reached a turning point as the values have recently 
risen sharply and the latest observation on the credit 
impulse is close to the historical average. This should 
be taken with a pinch of salt, however. It is basically 
only the last observation (November 2009) that drives 
this conclusion. However, it is clear that the 
deterioration has stopped. In addition the VIX, or 
volatility index (also shown in Figure 9), suggests that 
stock market volatility has returned to the pre-bust 
period average. Given that in the past lower stock 
market volatility was correlated with a higher credit 
impulse, one can thus expect that the recovery in credit 
conditions is likely to continue. The Impact of the Crisis on the Real Economy | 11 
5. Concluding  remarks 
A recurrent theme of this paper is that we should see the 
present crisis in light of the bubble that preceded it. It is 
thus not appropriate to look simply at the fall in GDP to 
measure the severity of the crisis. The current situation 
should thus be compared to a pre-bubble period if we 
are to use a proper benchmark. 
Viewing this crisis as a violent adjustment from an 
unsustainable bubble thus leads to a different 
perspective. It implies that the recovery will not depend 
only on financial markets returning to normal, but also 
on the amount of excess capacity that was created 
during the bubble. As there might now be significant 
excess capacity in several sectors (housing, durable 
consumption, etc.) investment might remain sluggish for 
some time to come. The legacy left by the bubble, more 
than official ‘stimulus’ programmes, will be decisive for 
the speed and durability of the recovery. 
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